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Obscenity in Cyberspace: Some Reasons for
Retaining the Local Community Standard
Timothy S. T. Basst
Debate has raged recently over the regulation of pornography
in cyberspace, and various articles document the abundance of
pornographic images available through computer networks.2 The
conviction of two cyberspace distributors of pornography has
fomented dispute about the application of current legal standards
to the new medium.' Despite the fact that many cyberspace
users argue for retaining an environment free of regulation,4
critics of cyberporn influenced Congress to enter the debate last
year,5 and Congress recently passed tough restrictions on obscenity and indecency that would make both cyberspace users and
service providers liable.6
This Comment addresses whether the current legal standard
that defines obscene expression should apply to cyberspace. To
determine what is obscene, the Supreme Court created the doctrine of local community standards,7 under which juries apply
the standards of a local community to determine whether material falls within the constitutionally unprotected category of ob-

t B.A. 1988, Yale University; M.B.A. 1994, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate
1997, University of Chicago.
See Sex on the Internet, Economist 18 (Jan 6, 1996).
2 See, for example, Geoffrey Wheelwright, Ways to Protect Children from 'Net Pornography, Financial Times VIII-8 (Dec 6, 1995) (noting proliferation of pornographic
materials in cyberspace) and Gina Boubion, On-Line Pornography Raises New Fears:
Government Grapples with Growing Tide of Material on Computers, Buff News A6 (Feb
27, 1994).
' See Couple Guilty of Sending Pornography by Computer, LA Times A10 (July 29,
1994).
See Internet Battles Study of On-line Pornography, Patriot Ledger 16 (July 17,
1995); Reaction To CompuServe Access Limits Upset Internet Enthusiasts, Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel 1 (Dec 30, 1995); and Alan Goldstein, CompuServe Blocks Internet Sex
Access, Dallas Morning News 1D (Dec 29, 1995).
' See Edmund L. Andrews, Once Touched by Notoriety, Donna Rice Is Now in Limelight FightingSmut, NY Times A10 (Nov 27, 1995).
6 See Edmund L. Andrews, Congress Votes to Reshape Communications Industry,
Ending a 4-Year Struggle, NY Times Al (Feb 2, 1996); The Telecommunications Bill
Conference, 104th Cong, 1st Sess, in 141 Cong Rec S18098 (Dec 6, 1995).
' See Miller v California,413 US 15, 37 (1973).
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scenity.' The Court created this standard partly to allow different geographical regions to adopt different definitions of obscenity.' If, in the new medium of cyberspace, the standard restricted
the diversity of obscenity definitions among jurisdictions, it
would frustrate .this policy justification for creating the local
community standard.
In cyberspace, more conservative communities could restrict
expression nationwide. Using currently existing technology, a
person in the most conservative jurisdiction in the country can
download obscene material from anywhere in cyberspace, so
prosecution might occur in such jurisdictions, and juries would
apply the local standard.' ° Conservative jurisdictions could thus
set the obscenity standard for all material accessible in
cyberspace.
Nevertheless, *this Comment argues for retaining the local
community standard in cyberspace. Applying the standard to
cyberspace would not violate non-speech constitutional rights of
individuals, and retaining the standard would also serve most of
its original policy goals. One such goal would be undermined:
since cyberspace is a worldwide, uniform network, application of
the local standard in cyberspace would defeat the Court's policy
of allowing diversity of obscenity definitions among jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, this policy argument does not have the persuasive
power of a constitutional argument. Furthermore, policy arguments in favor of the local community standard in cyberspace
counterbalance the lost diversity of standards. Finally, the alternatives to the local standard would cause more policy problems.
This Comment proceeds in Part I with an outline of the
current legal doctrine of obscenity and its underlying policy. Part
II addresses the implications of applying current law in
cyberspace and concludes that no non-speech constitutional
arguments preclude applying the standard, that several policy
goals of the standard support applying it, and that only one
policy criticism has any, validity. Part III provides additional
arguments for retaining the local community standard. First, it

8 Id.
Id at 33. This Comment does not treat the effect of the diversity policy, diverse
standards, as a constitutional right in itself, but rather as a policy justification for a
standard that defines the contours of First Amendment rights.
10 See United States v Thomas, 1996 US App LEXIS 1069, *23 (6th Cir) (citing
United States v Peraino, 645 F2d 548, 551 (6th Cir 1981)) (suggesting that the community-standards test might result in prosecutions of defendants from liberal jurisdictions in
conservative jurisdictions).
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argues that the standard would provide economic incentives to
invest in technology that would allow greater diversity among
jurisdictions. Then, it suggests that retaining the local standard
might provide the greatest freedom of expression when measured
across all media. Lastly, Part IV shows that alternatives to the
local community standard would fail to meet the policy objectives
of the obscenity doctrine to a greater extent than the local standard.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RULES GOVERNING
OBSCENITY

This Part first describes the legal framework and some of the
policy underlying the local community standard. It then outlines
the relevant federal statutes and venue rules that protect communities affected by obscene materials. Finally, it demonstrates
how the obscenity doctrine has weathered constitutional challenges regarding due process notice requirements and privacy
rights.1" It argues that, to the degree that applying local standards to cyberspace does not violate these constitutional rights,
policy issues are dispositive.
A. The Role of Local Community Standards in Defining Obscenity
Local standards partly define obscenity. Miller v California
set out the current test for what constitutes obscene material
subject to state regulation. To determine whether material is
obscene, the jury must consider:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest [citations
omitted]; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the

, To read an obscenity exclusion into the First Amendment, one must assume an
implicit historical rejection of obscenity "as utterly without redeeming social importance."
Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 484 (1957). This Comment focuses exclusively on the
impact of cyberspace on the obscenity doctrine and does not address alternative interpretations that would extend First Amendment protections to obscenity. It will also not
address whether the standards of contemporary society require broader protections. Note,
however, that if recent legislative initiatives are a measure of majoritarian sentiment,
contemporary standards seem to support regulation of cyberspace.
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work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. 2
The jury uses its local standard only in the first two parts of the
Miller test.13
Local community standards also have specific limitations.
Jurors must gauge the local standard based on the average person in the community of the indictment. 4 Additionally, juries
cannot exercise "unbridled discretion in determining what is
'patently offensive."" 5
B.

Policy Goals Underlying the Local Community Standard

Four significant policies underlie the local community standard: (1) administrability of settling on a workable standard; (2)
lack of alternative administrable standards; (3) federalism values; and (4) diversity of obscenity standards. The local community standards doctrine may promote the same policies in the new
medium of cyberspace, and, to the extent the doctrine meets
these criteria, the same policies support its application in
cyberspace.
The local community standard represented a workable solution to an administratively costly doctrine.1" The Miller standard, which has endured twenty-three years, ended sixteen years
of disagreement creating "concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard
core' pornography." 7
The Miller Court considered the local community standard
more administrable than its alternative--a national standard.
Miller v California,413 US 15, 24 (1973) (citing Kois v Wisconsin, 408 US 229, 230
(1972) (quoting Roth, 354 US at 489)). See generally Roth, 354 US 476; Hamling v United
States, 418 US 87 (1974); Jenkins v Georgia, 418 US 153 (1974); Sable Communications of
California,Inc. v FCC, 492 US 115 (1989).
" Pope v Illinois, 481 US 497, 500 (1987). The standard should be based on the
jurors' local community. Miller, 413 US at 30.
14 Smith v United States, 431 US 291, 304 (1977). The jury also must use a reasonable person standard under the third part of the Miller test, further limiting the effect of
the local standard in the first two parts of the test.
15 Jenkins, 418 US at 160 (reversing jury finding of obscenity). Obscenity doctrine
also addresses a narrow subset of pornography. Miller, 413 US at 18-19, n 2. The legal
definition of obscenity means obscene material that deals with sex, a subset of the lay
definition. Id. Additionally, courts have ruled that certain material, for example, mere
nudity, may not be regulated as obscene. See United States v Baranov, 293 F Supp 610,
615 (SD Cal 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 418 F2d 1051 (9th Cir 1969).
" See Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton, 413 US 49, 92 (1973) (Brennan dissenting)
(noting that "[tihe number of obscenity cases on our docket gives ample testimony to the
burden that has been placed upon this Court.").
I2

"7 Miller, 413 US at 29.
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The Court rejected fixed, uniform national standards as unworkable.18 The Court also reasoned that "'it would be unreasonable
to expect local courts to divine"'19 a national standard and that
"[t]o require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around
evidence of20a national 'community standard' would be an exercise
in futility."

The local community standard also supports federalism and
local autonomy by balancing federal, state, and local regulation.
The Miller Court imposed federal limits on the scope of state
regulation. 21 On the other hand, Miller did not "propose regulatory schemes for the States,"22 but instead, the Court stated that
such regimes "must await [states'] concrete legislative efforts. 23
Miller also carved out an integral role for local juries in defining
the limits of state regulations.24 Applying the local community
standard to cyberspace material would preserve the political
voice of the various local constituencies.
Additionally, the Court created a local rather than a national
standard at least partly to allow for diversity of obscenity definitions.25 A national standard might chill expression in more liberal jurisdictions.26 On the other hand, the Court also recognized
that a local standard might impede dissemination of materials to
a particular area if sellers feared testing the local standard.27
Federal Statutes 2s Regulating Obscenity

C.

Of the six federal statutes that regulate obscenity, only 18
USC § 1465 and 47 USC § 223 seem to apply to cyberspace.29

"S Id at 30 (noting that "[t]hese are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is
simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards
could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists.").
Id at 32 (quoting Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184, 200 (1964) (Warren dissenting)).
20 Id at 30 (second emphasis added).
21 Miller, 413 US at 23-24.
Id at 25.
23

Id.

24 See notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
21
26
2?

Miller, 413 US at 33.

Id.
Id at 32, n 13.

28 By one account, Florida is the only state with a statute that explicitly deals with

computer pornography. Henry J. Reske, Computer Porn a Prosecutorial Challenge:
Cyberspace Smut Easy to Distribute,Difficult to Track, Open to Legal Questions, 80 ABA J
40 (Dec 1994).
' See 18 USC §§ 1461, 1462, 1464, 1465, 1468; 47 USC § 223 (1994). Sections 1461,
1464, and 1468 clearly do not cover cyberspace because they regulate particular media.

476

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1996:

Congress recently amended 47 USC § 223 to apply to
cyberspace.3" Uncertainty in the law reflects the recent technological developments and the public debate about cyberspace
regulation.3 1
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1465 prohibits the transport of obscene
materials in interstate commerce for sale or distribution.32 In
United States v Thomas, the Sixth Circuit upheld a conviction
under Section 1465 for sending obscene images through
cyberspace.33 The Court held that the statute's language and
intent included the use of computer systems to transport materials.3 4

Title 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) prohibits engaging in obscene communications via telephone.3 5 Section 223(b)(2) prohibits indecent
communications that are knowingly made available to people
under age eighteen.3 6 Congress recently passed amendments to
Section 223 to cover obscene and indecent images and other com-

Section 1461 proscribes only the use of the mails for distribution of obscene materials, and
cyberspace communications occur through telephone lines which Congress regulates
separately from the postal service. See 18 USC § 1461. Section 1464 prohibits only radio
broadcasts of obscene or indecent language. 18 USC § 1464. Section 1468 prohibits only
distribution of obscene matter over cable television. 18 USC § 1468. Section 1462 proscribes the transport or import of obscene materials in interstate commerce by means of
an express company or common carrier. 18 USC § 1462. The Tenth Circuit has held that
"common carrier" in this context does not include telephones and that the statute prohibits only "tangible articles and not the intangible communication of telephone messages."
United States v Carlin Communications, Inc., 815 F2d 1367, 1371 (10th Cir 1987). See
also Bruce A. Taylor, National Law Center for Children and Families, letter to Representative Henry Hyde (July 28, 1995) (proposing amendments that add the phrases "telephone facility" and "any communications" to Sections 1462 and 1465 to make them applicable to cyberspace).
30 Edmund L. Andrews, Congress Votes to Reshape Communications Industry, Ending
a 4-Year Struggle, NY Times Al (Feb 2, 1996) (cited in note 6).
" This Comment will not address whether obscenity laws could impose liability on
bulletin board operators, an issue which addresses scienter requirements and not whether
the local community standard should apply. The current law requires knowledge of the
obscene nature of the communications.
32 18 USC § 1465 (1994).
'3 United States v Thomas, 1996 US App LEXIS 1069, *15-*16 (6th Cir).
3 Id at "14-*16. But see Carlin, 815 F2d at 1371 (differentiating between telephone
communications and physical objects and holding that Section 1465 does not extend to
dial-a-porn telephone messages since it does not cover intangible articles).
35 47 USC § 223 (1994). It also forbids those who control telephone facilities from
knowingly permitting the use of those facilities for obscene communications. Id. Where
there is a commercial purpose, liability attaches "regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call."' Sable, 492 US at 123, n 4 (quoting 47 USC
§ 223(b)(1)(A)). See also id at 123-26 (upholding prohibition of obscene calls under Section
223).
36 47 USC § 223(b)(2). Restricting access by prescribed methods, however, provides a
defense to a charge under this Section. 47 USC § 223(b)(3).
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munications transmitted or made available in cyberspace. 7 Courts could uphold the recent amendments that go
beyond current obscenity laws and restrict access to indecent
materials if these provisions use the least restrictive means."
Courts have permitted regulation of. pornography that goes beyond obscenity law in radio, broadcast television, and cable television.39 The FCC also may restrict access by minors to dial-aporn if they employ the "least restrictive" means that minimize
interference with adult access to those services. 4°
D. Venue Rules under Federal Obscenity Statutes Promote a
Policy Goal of the Obscenity Doctrine
In protecting the community affected by the obscene expression, current venue rules further a policy goal underlying regulation of obscenity. Limiting venue in federal cases would undermine this goal.
Courts allow venue for obscenity prosecutions in either the
district of dispatch or of receipt.41 Congress made violations of
the federal obscenity statutes continuing offenses to allow prosecution in the jurisdiction where the materials are received,42
"
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat 56, 133-135.
The House-Senate conference committee agreed on the language passed by the Senate.
Edmund L. Andrews, Bill Would Curb On-Line Obscenity, NY Times Al, B12 (Dec 7,
1995). The amendment would impose liability on service providers unless they make goodfaith efforts to restrict such materials from minors. Id.
8 One commentator argues that the similarity of cyberspace to dial-a-porn services
justifies less stringent regulation of cyberspace. Comment, Cyber-Porn Obscenity: The
Viability of Local Community Standards and the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer
Network Age, 15 Loyola LA Enter L J 415, 435 (1995). This argument ignores the indecency regulation of dial-a-porn.
' See FCC v Pacifica Foundation,438 US 726, 742-51 (1978). See also Note, Indecent
Exposure on the Information Superhighway: Regulating Pornographyon IntegratedBroadband Telecommunications Networks, 11 Ga St U L Rev 465, 474-78 (1995); but see ACLU
v Reno, 929 F Supp 824 (ED Pa 1996) (granting preliminary injunction against the sections of recent amendments that reach indecency); Shea v Reno, 930 F Supp 916 (SD NY
1996) (holding that indecency sections of new amendments are unconstitutionally
overbroad).
40 See Sable, 492 US at 126-31.
' See United States v Bagnell, 679 F2d 826, 829, 832 (11th Cir 1982) (holding that
venue proper in either district of dispatch or of receipt for charges under 18 USC §§ 1462,
1465); United States v Thomas, 613 F2d 787, 792 (10th Cir 1980) (noting that government
can prosecute mailing of obscene materials in either district of dispatch or of receipt);
Reed Enterprises v Corcoran, 354 F2d 519, 521 (DC Cir 1965) (noting that Congress
permitted venue in any district through which material passed in order to facilitate successful prosecution). The "district of dispatch" refers to the geographical district in which
the defendants upload the materials to cyberspace, and the "district of receipt" refers to
the geographical district where the recipients download the materials.
42 Amending Section 1461 of Title 18 of the United States Code, Relating to the
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since "[the] main evil to be combatted is the harm done to those
who are exposed to obscene material at the point of receipt."43
E.

Obscenity Doctrine
Notice" Challenges

Prevails

over

Constitutional

Fair-

Courts have rejected fair-notice challenges to obscenity regulations based on the intent requirement. 4' The Miller Court held
that its definition of obscenity would not violate due process

requirements of fair notice.46 A defendant who knows the "character and nature of the materials" meets the intent requirement
under federal statutes,4 7 and there is no need for the defendant
to know the law that will apply.4 8 Under the local community
standard, prosecutors thus need not show that the defendant
knew which jurisdiction's law would apply to the downloading of
the defendant's materials from cyberspace.

Mailing of Obscene or Crime-Inciting Matter, S Rep No 1839, 85th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1958)
(stating purpose of amendment is to make mailing of obscene material a continuing
offense). The Sixth Amendment requires that prosecution occur in a "district wherein the
crime shall have been committed .... US Const, Amend VI.
"' S Rep No 1839 at 3 (cited in note 42). Courts rarely grant motions for transfer of
venue in obscenity cases. A transfer motion would require a showing "such as intentional
overreaching by the government." United States v McManus, 535 F2d 460, 464 (8th Cir
1976). Courts limit these motions partly because prosecutions in the community affected
by the obscene material are reasonable. Bagnell, 679 F2d at 832. Additionally, the jury in
that district can apply its local community standards more easily. See United States v
Germain, 411 F Supp 719, 729 (SD Ohio 1975); United States v Slepicoff, 524 F2d 1244,
1249 (5th Cir 1975); Thomas, 1996 US App LEXIS 1096 at *19 (noting that "the effects of
the Defendants' criminal conduct reached the Western District of Tennessee, and that
district was suitable for accurate fact-finding.").
" The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that criminal laws
provide fair notice of "what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v New Jersey, 306
US 451, 453 (1939).
"' See Miller, 413 US at 27-28; Hamling, 418 US at 119-24. "The Constitution requires proof of scienter to avoid the hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally protected
material and to compensate for the ambiguities inherent in the definition of obscenity."
Mishkin v New York, 383 US 502, 511 (1966). This quote makes clear the connection
between scienter and due process notice requirements.
46 Miller, 413 US at 27.
Hamling, 418 US at 123.
48 Id (noting that "[t]o require proof of a defendant's knowledge of the legal status of
the materials would permit the defendant to avoid prosecution by simply claiming that he
had not brushed up on the law.").
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Constitutional Privacy Rights 9 Do Not Significantly Limit
the Obscenity Doctrine

F.

Courts have rejected privacy-rights challenges to laws that
control obscenity outside the home.5" Privacy rights have some
theoretical but little practical importance in the regulation of
obscene material. Privacy rights protect possession of obscene
materials in the home," but this protection "[does] not create a
right to receive, transport, or distribute obscene material ...."5
Once materials leave the home in either public or private transport, privacy rights are no longer relevant. 53

II. OPERATION OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY STANDARDS IN
CYBERSPACE
This Part discusses the legal implications of applying local
community standards to cyberspace material. It argues that the
application of local standards to cyberspace would not violate the
two relevant constitutional doctrines of fair notice and privacy
rights. The Comment then focuses on policy goals of the obscenity
doctrine. It argues that applying local community standards in
cyberspace would accomplish most of the policy goals underlying
the doctrine.
A. Applying Local Community Standards to Cyberspace Meets
Constitutional Requirements5 4
The local community standard as applied to cyberspace material would meet due process notice requirements.55 As in other

" "The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it
protects other special privacy rights such as those of marriage, procreation, motherhood,
child rearing, and education." United States v Orito, 413 US 139, 142 (1973).
' See id at 141-44; Thomas, 1996 US App LEXIS 1096 at *20-21. Some criticisms of
using the local community doctrine for cyberspace material relate to privacy rights. These
criticisms, however, may pertain to the doctrine as it applies to other media. They do not
undermine the application of the doctrine to the new medium.
SI

Smith, 431 US at 307.

Id. See also Stanley v Georgia, 394 US 557 (1969).
Orito, 413 US at 140-42. Orito transported obscene materials for private purposes
on a common carrier-a commercial airline. Id. "Congress may regulate on the basis of the
natural tendency of material in the home being kept private and the contrary tendency
once material leaves that area, regardless of a transporter's professed intent." Id at 143.
' This Comment takes a position on the constitutional issues and leaves a full
exploration of those issues for a later date.
' But see Comment, Cyber-Porn Obscenity: The Viability of Local Community Standards and the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer Network Age, 15 Loyola LA Enter L J
415, 434 (1995) (cited in note 38) (arguing that applying the obscenity doctrine to
52
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media, statutory intent requirements would satisfy the notice
requirements. "'[T]he Constitution does not require impossible
standards'; all that is required is that the language 'conveys
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices."'56 The Miller test meets this standard of providing notice,57 and a sender of
obscene material in cyberspace would satisfy the intent requirement if he or she knew the nature of the materials sent.
Some fair-notice criticisms of applying the local community
standard in cyberspace pertain to the doctrine more generally.5 8
For example, one criticism is that a defendant cannot know how
a jury will apply the standard. In cyberspace the defendant
might not know which community will receive the material or in
which community he or she will face prosecution, and perhaps by
knowing the particular community of prosecution the defendant
could limit this uncertainty. Courts have not, however, considered uncertainty about jury discretion in obscenity cases a constitutional problem.
One might argue that making obscene material available in
cyberspace differs from "purposefully" sending it through the
mail, since the sender might not know the particular jurisdiction
of download. Cyberspace obscenity is not necessarily the result of
active dissemination or geographical targeting, since someone
could post obscene material to a network to which geographically
dispersed people have access.59 For example, material might reside on the computer of a bulletin board operator, and the receiver of the obscene material might access it by calling the
distributor's computer. Senders of obscene material, however, are
probably aware that receivers in multiple jurisdictions can download the material. The sender then would have notice about the

cyberspace would violate fundamental notions of fairness because of intervening acts of
downloading user). See also Comment, Free Speech on the Line: Modern Technology and
the FirstAmendment, 3 Comm L Conspectus 197, 202 (1995).
" Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 491-92 (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v Petrillo, 332 US 1, 7-8 (1947)).
17 Miller v California, 413 US 15, 28 n 10 (1973).
' To the extent criticisms attack the obscenity doctrine generally, they fall outside
the scope of a Comment on cyberspace.
See Comment, 15 Loyola LA Enter L J at 430 (cited in note 38). See also United
States v Thomas, 1996 US App LEXIS 1069, *25-*26 (6th Cir) (noting that while some
bulletin-board operators have no control over the locations of downloading, defendants
had control and therefore had no First Amendment claim).
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possibility of facing local laws, 0 though he or she might not
know the particular legal standards.
The application of the obscenity doctrine in dial-a-porn cases
provides a counterargument to fair-notice criticisms, since as in
cyberspace, dial-a-porn service providers do not know what jurisdiction will receive their transmitted phone messages. Additionally, in neither case do the transmissions constitute a purposeful
sending. The Supreme Court has, however, upheld the prosecution of dial-a-porn service providers in the jurisdiction of the
caller, 1 so that the burden falls on the obscenity distributor to
discover where calls originate and to tailor its services "to the
communities it chooses to serve." 2
Like fair-notice rights, privacy rights do not prevent the
application of a local community standard in cyberspace.63 The
Supreme Court has limited significantly the extent to which
privacy rights protect obscene materials once they leave the
home.'
6o See Miller, 413 US at 27. One commentator argues that the cyberspace receiver of
obscene material is like a purchaser of a magazine in one state who then takes the
magazine into another state, and that neither the magazine seller nor the cyberspace
defendant should be subject to prosecution for sending obscenity into another jurisdiction.
Comment, 15 Loyola Enter L J at 434 (cited in note 38). See also William S. Byassee,
Jurisdictionof Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30
Wake Forest L Rev 197, 211-13 (1995). Offering a magazine for sale in a specific geographical location differs from making material available on the Internet, however,
because the Internet has no geographical boundaries and transmitters have reasonable
warning that the material is available outside their own geographic location.
6
Sable Communications of California,Inc. v FCC, 492 US 115, 125 (1989).
62

Id.

6

Byassee argues that there is a "poor fit" between cyberspace and obscenity stat-

utes, whose purpose is to prevent obscene materials from passing through unwilling local
communities, because cyberspace materials go directly from senders to the recipient's
home, where privacy rights limit the reach of obscenity regulations. Byassee, 30 Wake
Forest L Rev at 203-10 (cited in note 60). See also Comment, 15 Loyola LA Enter L J at
437 (cited in note 38) (arguing that cyberspace materials have less impact on local communities than materials in other media). Byassee disregards Supreme Court rulings on
privacy rights with regard to obscene materials. Byassee, 30 Wake Forest L Rev at 203210.
, See United States v Orito, 413 US 139, 141. See also notes 49-53 and accompanying text. This Comment does not address the physical distinction between cyberspace and
other potentially obscene material since it assumes this distinction not to be relevant to
the question at hand-whether local community or some other standard should apply in
evaluating cyberspace material. Cyberspace material is transmitted as electronic impulses, series of "Os" and "ls," and then appears as text or images after being processed by the
receivers' software. This fact, however, is unlikely to give rise to a legal distinction between cyberspace material and other physical substances, especially since the software to
format electronic transmissions is widely available. Similarly, courts would be unlikely to
distinguish obscene material carried in the form of a puzzle, particularly one that most
people could put together. One might argue further that electronic transmissions might be
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Privacy issues do not differ significantly in cyberspace from
in other media. For example, both cyberspace and the-mail bring
material directly to the consumer's home, and privacy rights do
not protect obscene material traveling through the mail once it
leaves the home. Cyberspace similarly delivers material directly
to the consumer's home. In United States v Orito, privacy rights
did not shield the defendant's transporting obscene materials on
commercial airlines for private purposes.65 Since courts have no
technology-specific reason to apply a different privacy standard to
cyberspace, privacy rights do not present a viable challenge to
application of the local community standard to cyberspace.
B.

Applying Local Community
Upholds Policy Objectives

Standards

to

Cyberspace

Several of the policy arguments underlying the obscenity
doctrine support its application to cyberspace materials. The
standard would continue to promote the administrability goals
and federalism policy issues supporting the local community
standard. Perhaps most importantly, however, the standard also
allows affected communities to regulate obscene material.
The Miller Court adopted the local community standard as
an administratively workable and less costly solution to the problem of defining obscenity.6" There is no reason the guidelines
would not work as well in cyberspace as in other media, because
the technology does not affect the ability of the jurors to know
their own community's standards. Applying the doctrine to
cyberspace would thus continue to serve the administrability
objective.
The local community standard also serves the federalism
objectives of the obscenity doctrine.6 7 The Miller doctrine allows
states and, indirectly, local communities to set their own stan-

sent as separate bundles that, independently, could not be formatted into text or images,
or could be otherwise encoded. This argument, however, brings one to the consideration
the jury makes in each case, of whether the particular material sent is obscene, and it
does not address the question of whether courts should use the local community standard
to make that determination. The fact that distributors might disguise material until it
arrives in a particular home does not mean that all distributors would take such precautions. Furthermore, it is not clear that scrambling or encoding cyberspace material would
eliminate what the Orito Court considered its tendency to affect the public once it leaves
the home (see note 53), particularly where the method or device for unscrambling or
decoding becomes available to people other than the original recipient.
Orito, 413 US at 140-41.
See notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
67 See notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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dards about the type of pornographic material they tolerate.
Since the local community standard may allow one community to
impoge its standard on another in cyberspace, one could argue
that only the most conservative community would have the ability to set its own standard in cyberspace under this approach.
With other media, individuals might solve the problem of finding
themselves in a community that does not match their tastes by
moving to a different jurisdiction, but people do not have this
option in the context of cyberspace. On the other hand, blocking
the distribution of obscene material through cyberspace has a
limited impact, since people can still distribute obscene material
through other media that do not reach conservative local communities as an alternative to distributing that material through
cyberspace. Individuals will retain the option of seeking communities that are more or less restrictive with regard to other media.
The local interest in preserving regulatory autonomy provides a strong policy argument. The majority of the local community should have some rights against the national majority.68
Although cyberspace is not within a specific geographical territory, the autonomy interest applies equally well to cyberspace as to
other media, some of which, like phone lines, also do not have a
specific geographical territory. Moreover, local geographical authorities cannot establish or police boundaries as easily in
cyberspace, so geographical regions are more susceptible to an
influx of obscene material through cyberspace than through traditional media. The difficulties of enforcement increase the need
for local autonomy to set more stringent restrictions on obscene
material.
Whether the local or national majority has a greater interest
in dictating obscenity standards is to some extent a political judgment. Recent legislative initiatives indicate that the majoritarian
process favors more conservative legislation for cyberspace.69
The one clear advantage of a local standard is that technology may develop that will preserve the local autonomy of all
communities, whether liberal or conservative, by selectively
blocking access to objectionable cyberspace material in the con-

8 The local community standard reflects the views of a majority in two respects:
first, through the jury's application of the standard of the average citizen in the local
community, and second, through state regulation of obscenity. Federal regulation based
on interstate commerce powers to some extent reduces the importance of the latter since
defendants may face federal rather than state prosecutions.
"9 See note 37 and accompanying text..
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servative jurisdictions only.7" If courts overturn the Miller standard and impose a more liberal standard on conservative communities, local communities will lose some autonomy to determine
their own standards. In that case, conservative local communities
would not have the option of preserving their autonomy through
technology, since the development of screening devices most likely would not occur in the absence of legislation restricting obscene expression.7 1
The right of the local community to protect itself from perceived harms provides the strongest argument in favor of applying the standard to cyberspace. This argument cuts two ways,
however, with cyberspace communications: conservative jurisdictions have an interest in setting conservative regulations, but
liberal jurisdictions have an interest in setting liberal regulations. On the one hand, under a liberal national standard, conservative citizens could not regulate their own environment. On
the other hand, under the conservative nationwide regime that
results from the local standard, citizens cannot choose to live in
or express themselves in more liberal jurisdictions. Due to the
impact of conservative standards on other communities under
current technology, regulating obscene expression within the
community would effectively regulate it outside the community.
The more liberal jurisdiction, however, would preserve a perceived right of expression rather than limit a perceived harm
from expression.72
A counterargument to the local standard might focus on the
incentives resulting from the discretionary nature of the local
rule. Overdeterrence might occur in all media. Ex ante uncertainty about juries might result in censoring of material that a jury
would not find obscene. In order to avoid prosecution and convic70 See notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
" Additionally, conservative local communities might face greater collective action
problems than the users or distributors of obscene material in developing technology. This
could result from greater numbers or from lack of familiarity with the technology and lack
of a profit motive.
72 One might argue that more conservative regulation should prevail in three out of
four possible states of the world. Where both a real harm from obscenity occurs and the
free expression rights exist, conservative regulation should prevail. Clearly, where there is
harm but no rights, conservative regulation should prevail. One could argue that where
there is no harm and no rights, conservative regulation should prevail since it permits

sovereignty without infringing rights. Perhaps courts should impose more liberal regulation only on more conservative jurisdictions where the rights exist and no harm occurs.

This reasoning implies that, if we cannot know whether the right exists or the harm
occurs, and there are equal probabilities of both existing, courts should favor the standard
that would be correct in three out of four possible states.

471]

OBSCENITY AND THE LOCAL STANDARD

tion, expression might be chilled to a greater degree than would
be true under a clear and explicit rule. Uncertainty about where
receivers will download cyberspace material might exacerbate the
overdeterrence problem with the local community standard. If
people do not know where a prosecution might occur, they might
tend to overestimate their potential liability and reduce their
expression more than necessary.
The validity of the overdeterrence argument depends on
empirical evidence. As a result of a recent pornography prosecution in Germany, CompuServe blocked more than two hundred
bulletin boards that provided potentially contraband material.73
This action did not necessarily represent overdeterrence.
CompuServe simply complied with German standards and shut
down the newsgroups that German authorities specifically identified.74 Since CompuServe's technology could not block by geographic region, its customers outside Germany also had to comply with German standards.75
C.

Application of Local Community Standards to Cyberspace
Conflicts with the Policy Objective of Diversity among
Jurisdictions

As some writers have pointed out, cyberspace technology
raises a new issue regarding the community standard: the most
conservative community might dictate obscenity for the whole
country.76 Courts, however, have not always made diversity an
overriding policy objective.
While the Supreme Court may have created the local community standard partly to permit greater expression in communities more tolerant than the national average,7 its application to
cyberspace would have the opposite effect. "[T]he most conservative, 'Bible-Belt' state may wind up dictating the obscenity laws
of all other states as the lowest common denominator of sexual
acceptability.""

7 Michael Meyer, Pornography on the Internet Weaves a Tangled Web, Portland
Oregonian E5 (Jan 7, 1996).
"' Alan Goldstein, CompuServe Blocks Internet Sex Access, Dallas Morning News 1D
(Dec 29, 1995) (cited in note 4).
71 Meyer, Portland Oregonian at E5 (cited in note 73).
76 See Comment, 15 Loyola LA Enter L J at 433-34 (cited in note 38); Byassee, 30
Wake Forest L Rev at 210 (cited in note 60).
77 Miller, 413 US at 32 n 13.
71 Comment, 15 Loy LA Enter L J at 433-34 (citation omitted) (cited in note 38). See
also Note, The Freedom of Speech at Risk in Cyberspace: Obscenity Doctrine and a Fright-
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If each cyberspace user must govern her speech in accordance with the most restrictive of these communities,
then either much will remain unexpressed, or, more
likely, the virtual community will restrict access of the
members of those restrictive jurisdictions to entire [sic]
conversational subjects or to membership in the community itself. Either alternative substantially chills the
free expression of, and exchange about, topics for which
significant controversy exists.7 9
In sum, the effect of applying the local standard to cyberspace
might be a mix of: (1) conservative community standards chilling
expression in permissive communities, and (2) networks limiting
access to cyberspace conversations, thus chilling expression in
less permissive communities."
Courts, however, have not always given the policy objective
of diversity among jurisdictions primary importance. In several
instances courts, by applying local standards to other media that
span multiple communities, have not preserved strict diversity
among jurisdictions. Dial-a-porn services may face prosecution in
any district,"l and, to a lesser degree, television and radio broadcasting also reach multiple jurisdictions and may face the local
community standard in each jurisdiction.8 2
When deciding whether to overturn the local community
standard, courts will need to weigh the several goals that the
standard promotes against the diversity goal that it hinders. The
local standard achieves administrability, federalism, and local
autonomy goals that were integral to the rationale of the original
doctrine. The fact that the courts have not always promoted strict

ened University's Censorshipof Sex on the Internet, 44 Duke L J 1155, 1169 (1995).
7' Byassee, 30 Wake Forest L Rev at 210 (cited in note 60).
Technology for scrambling or blocking indecent material has not yet developed
though a consortium of companies has formed for that purpose. See Jared Sandberg, U.S.
Cracks Down on On-Line Child Pornography, Wall St J A3 (Sept 14, 1995). One author
notes that "the Internet is presently impossible to censor for purely technical reasons."
Comment, 15 Loyola LA Enter L J at 418 (cited in note 38). Additionally, due to the
anonymity of bulletin boards, prosecutors might have difficulty finding the person who
uploads obscene materials. "[Tihe BBS operator may be unaware of the distribution of
potentially obscene material due to the automatic operation of his software." Id at 422.
"' Sable, 492 US at 126 (noting that "[i]f Sable's audience is comprised of different
communities with different local standards, Sable ultimately bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on obscene messages.").
82 See Carlin Communications, Inc. v FCC, 837 F2d 546, 561 (2d Cir 1988) (holding
that 47 USC § 223(b) 'does not create an impermissible national obscenity standard any
more than do the federal laws prohibiting the mailing of obscene materials, or the broadcasting of obscene messages." (citations omitted)).
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diversity, particularly in the area of dial-a-porn services, may
imply that this objective has less value than others. The following section will discuss other policy objectives, left unstated by
the Miller Court, that support retaining local standards.

III. Two ADDITIONAL POLICY ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE
LOCAL COMMUNITY STANDARD

Two additional arguments support retaining the Miller standard. First, markets may well be better equipped than courts to
promote diversity objectives. The local rule creates proper incentives because service providers and others may want to invest in
developing technology to avoid the local standards of more conservative communities. Second, even if local standards restrict
expression in cyberspace, they might allow more expression when
considering the aggregate impact on all media.
A. Local Standards Create Appropriate Economic Incentives"3
An economic analysis provides an argument in favor of the
local community approach. One might start with the premise
that the legal rule should spur useful technological innovation. A
rule which invalidates the community standard will not create
incentives for innovation. Without the local community standard,
conservative communities would need to promulgate regulations
to develop technologies that would block obscene materials from
the entire community. Additionally, local majorities probably
would face greater transaction costs than obscenity distributors
in organizing and investing in such technology development since
distributors are likely to be fewer in number and have more
unified objectives in promoting their business interests." On the

Economic analyses of First Amendment issues are increasingly common. See, for
example, Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 Harv L Rev 554 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic
Perspective, 20 Suffolk U L Rev 1 (1986); R. H. Coase, The Economics of the First
Amendment: The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 Am Econ Rev 384 (1974).
R.H. Coase maintains:
Of course, if market transactions were costless, all that matters (questions of
equity apart) is that the rights of the various parties should be well-defined and
the results of legal actions easy to forecast. But as we have seen, the situation is
quite different when market transactions are so costly as to make it difficult to
change the arrangement of rights established by the law. In such cases, the
courts directly influence economic activity.
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 19 (1960).
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other hand, the local community standard would spur investment
in finding technology to permit jurisdictionally-oriented access.
One might counter that courts should not take an economic
perspective when addressing First Amendment issues. For one,
market prices for computer technology might undervalue obscene
expression." Additionally, judges do not have economic expertise. The Supreme Court, however, has given some indication
that economic considerations for prohibited expression questions
are proper. In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v FCC,
the Court indicated that a provider of dial-a-porn services could
face local obscenity standards in the communities where callers
lived."6 The Court stated that "[w]hile Sable may be forced to
incur some costs in developing and implementing a system for
screening the locale of incoming calls, there is no constitutional
impediment to enacting a law which may impose such costs on a
medium electing to provide these messages.""
The Sable Court restricted additional expression at the market costs, and it did not address the possibility that the market
might undervalue obscene expression. If the Court, however, had
not imposed the costs on the dial-a-porn providers, those whose
regulatory zeal the Court frustrated would have paid. Under the
current regime, the market can monetize at least a portion of the
costs for delivering potentially obscene dial-a-porn materials. On
the other hand, the market could not monetize as directly the
psychic costs of a more liberal dial-a-porn obscenity regime.88
Similarly, the local community rule would create economic
incentives for cyberspace obscenity providers. The recent
CompuServe case provides a testament to this theory.

A market externality might exist, namely that some citizens might derive disutility
from knowing that an obscenity parameter restricts free expression. Without transaction
costs they might be willing to pay to avoid'this disutility, and the payments could flow to
those who suffer harm from unwillingly experiencing or simply knowing of obscene expression. The current regulatory environment of cyberspace might be a situation where a
large, diffuse group faces a small group, like the Christian Coalition, that incurs relatively
lower organizational costs. See Julian Dibbell, Muzzling the Internet: Can This Congress
Find a Way to Preserve Civil Liberties While Curbing Cyberporn? So Far, No., Time 75
(Dec 18, 1995) (discussing lobbying efforts of Christian Coalition); Edmund L. Andrews,
Bill Would Curb On-Line Obscenity, NY Times Al, B12 (Dec 7, 1995) (cited in note 37)
(discussing position of Christian Coalition on regulations). The Economic Theory of
Regulation predicts that in such a situation the small group can extract value that exceeds market prices through political processes. See generally Sam Peltzman, Toward a
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J L & Econ 211 (1976).
' Sable Communications of California, Inc. v FCC, 492 US 115, 125 (1989).
8' Id.
" The costs, however, might be reflected in voter anger on this or other issues.
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CompuServe shut down over two hundred news groups to comply
with orders from German officials.89 CompuServe has fewer
than 200,000 customers in Germany, but all 4 million of its
worldwide customers suffered the consequences of the German
order. ° CompuServe reacted by starting to develop technology
that will eventually tailor access by location 9 since it would
9 2 alGermany.
of
outside
groups
news
banned
the
to
low access
Applying local community standards to obscenity providers
would probably have a similar effect. CompuServe differs since it
connects its customers to newsgroups but does not provide pornographic material, but the example indicates that imposing local
standards will lead to technological investment. Presumably,
CompuServe believes it will reap a return on the investment by
passing the costs on to customers, and, likewise, if providers of
obscene material expect to pass costs on to their customers, they
will invest in technology to limit geographic exposures.
B.

Free Expression in the Aggregate

One might measure the effect of the local community standard on particular media or on all media together. 3 In one scenario, courts would apply the same obscenity standard to all
media. In aggregate, across all media, the local community standard might increase freedom of expression relative to other possible standards. For example, a national standard might impose reMichael Meyer, Pornography on the Internet Weaves a Tangled Web, Portland
Oregonian E5 (Jan 7, 1996) (cited in note 72). German officials maintain that
CompuServe complied voluntarily, but CompuServe officials indicated they felt they had
no choice. Nathaniel Nash, Holding CompuServe Responsible, NY Times C4 (Jan 15,
1996).
Meyer, Portland Oregonian at E5 (cited in note 74).
"
Jared Sandberg, CompuServe Seeks a High-Tech Answer to Fracas Over Bar on
Adult Material,Wall St J B10 (Jan 5, 1996).
Id.
"
"[C]ourts that invoke the marketplace model of the first amendment [sic] justify
free expression because of the aggregate benefits to society, and not because an individual
speaker receives a particular benefit." Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L J 1, 4 (1984) (critiquing the marketplace model). See also
Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting) (enunciating the
marketplace of ideas approach to the First Amendment). This Comment looks at aggregate free speech rather than the aggregate social benefits from free speech. The ideas are
related in that if aggregate benefits are important, aggregate free speech may also be an
important measure. Fifth Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence provides another
analogy. The destruction of one strand of a bundle of property rights is not a taking since
"the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Andrus v Allard, 444 US 51, 65-66 (1979).
By analogy, restricting one avenue of obscene expression might not constitute a restriction
of aggregate free expression.
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strictions on communities that would have more liberal standards under a regime of local autonomy, but, even with conservative cyberspace restrictions, more liberal communities would
preserve the freedom to express obscene material through other
media. If the standard permits more free expression overall, it
might be more attractive to advocates of free expression, even
though it restricts expression in one particular medium.94
At the worst, application of the local community standard to
cyberspace material does not suppress potentially obscene expression generally, it only suppresses such expression in a particular
medium. Other distribution channels still would face varying
levels of regulation. Implementing a national standard in
cyberspace, however, would not preserve the current distribution
level of potentially obscene materials. Distributors could instead
expose the most conservative localities to obscene material that
such communities could regulate when distributed through other
media.
Perhaps obscenity does not deserve national or even international circulation. Before the advent of cyberspace, it did not have
this type of circulation as readily. Why are other media that were
previously adequate for delivering obscene expression suddenly
inadequate for that purpose with the growth of cyberspace?
One might argue that cyberspace expression deserves protection as another medium of expression for the uploader, a medium
that is actually located in the geographic space of the upload.
Cyberspace, however, is physically located in multiple geographic
spaces: the upload and the download(s). Perhaps networks that
distribute questionable material should limit access to geographic
regions where local standards would not consider the material
obscene. Then people in more restrictive communities would face
the same restrictions as prior to the advent of cyberspace. The
local community standard provides the right incentives for such
technology to develop.

One could argue that another standard would promote more free expression while
maintaining other policy goals of the local community standard. Courts could create a
special, more liberal standard that applied only to cyberspace. Theoretically, this standard
would preserve the current level of free expression in other media while allowing more
free expression in cyberspace. This medium-specific standard, however, would encourage
the distribution of obscene material through cyberspace to avoid more restrictive regulations in other media. Thus, a special cyberspace standard would render regulations of
other media ineffective.
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IV. LOCAL COMMUNITY STANDARDS ARE SUPERIOR TO
ALTERNATIVES

This Part discusses how alternatives to local community
standards would raise significant policy problems.95 Courts could
base standards on national or cyberspace communities or on the
community of dispatch,96 and the jury would apply the standard
of the relevant community to determine whether material is
obscene. Courts should not prefer any of these options to the local
community standard since all of them fail to meet significant
policy objectives.
A.

Policy Problems with A National or Cyberspace Standard

Various formulations of a national standard would reduce
diversity, the primary criticism of applying local community standards to cyberspace. Additionally, national standards either do
not avoid the application of local community standards or are not
administratively feasible.
A national standard would present the same diversity problems as the local standard. One commentator, Joanna H. Kim,
suggests a national standard.97 Kim acknowledges but does not
address in detail the Miller court's criticisms of a national standard.98 Implementing a national standard would not preserve
diversity among jurisdictions, and, in fact, the Court adopted the

"
This Comment will not discuss elimination of the obscenity doctrine altogether.
Justice Brennan has proposed elimination of the obscenity doctrine based, to a large
extent, on the view that no standard could provide adequate notice, though he agrees that
obscenity falls outside of First Amendment protection. ParisAdult Theatre I v Slaton, 413
US 49, 84-86 (1973) (Brennan dissenting). See also notes 44-53 and accompanying text
(discussing fair notice requirements).
" "Community of dispatch" refers to the district in which defendants upload materials to cyberspace.
" Comment, Cyber-Porn Obscenity: The Viability of Local Community Standardsand
the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer Network Age, 15 Loyola LA Enter L J 415, 441442 (1995) (cited in note 38). See also Note, Obscenity in the Age of Direct BroadcastSatellite: A Final Burial for Stanley v. Georgia, A National Obscenity Standard, and Other
Miscellany, 33 Wm & Mary L Rev 949 (1992); but see CarlinCommunications, Inc. v FCC,
837 F2d 546, 561 (2d Cir 1988) (assuming a national obscenity standard would be impermissible). A per se rule that would define obscenity objectively, for example, as "graphic
depictions of sexual acts," would not create a truly national standard since it would
capture only one type of obscene material, leaving other types subject to local community
standards. See Bruce A. Taylor, Hard-CorePornography:A Proposalfor a Per Se Rule, 21
U Mich J L Ref 255, 272-74 (1988).
" See Comment, Cyber-Porn Obscenity: The Viability of Local Community Standards
and the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer Network, 15 Loyola LA Enter L J 415, 44142 (1995) (cited in note 38).
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Miller rule partly to allow for greater diversity.9" On the one
hand, the local standard would reduce diversity of obscenity standards for cyberspace expression, but the national standard would
not alleviate that problem and even might reduce diversity in all
media.
A national standard also would pose administrability problems that the local standard avoids. First, the jury in obscenity
litigation would not have an inherent understanding of a national standard as it does with its own local standard,100 so both the
prosecution and defense would need to call expert witnesses. 01'
At a minimum, informing the jury about standards that they do
not understand necessarily would take time, and experts would
probably charge fees, thus increasing litigation costs. Furthermore, it may be impossible to know or communicate a national
standard to a jury.0 2 The Miller court created the local community standard partly to avoid such problems.
Courts might also use the standards of a community of
cyberspace users.0 3 One would probably need to define a national versus international cyberspace community to avoid overstepping sovereign lawmaking power, though cyberspace extends
beyond national boundaries. Since cyberspace communities come
from the nation as a whole, they represent a form of national
standard. Defendants would probably try to narrow the definition
from the whole to a particular cyberspace community, since, almost by definition, a standard based on newsgroups that permit
or encourage obscene materials would acquit in a prosecution for
that same material.0 4 Thus, juries applying cyberspace stan-

9 See Miller v California, 413 US 15, 30 (1973).
See id at 31-32; Paris, 413 US at 56, n6.
, Although courts currently have discretion to admit expert testimony on local
'

community standards, United States v Bagnell, 679 F2d 826, 833 (11th Cir 1982), the
prosecution does not need to produce experts, and juries do not need to take the testimony
of such experts into consideration. Hamling v United States, 418 US 87, 108 (1974);
United States v Thomas, 1996 US App LEXIS 1069, *30-*34.
102 See Paris, 413 US at 56, n 6 (discussing expert testimony). One might argue that
modern survey and other statistical techniques have improved the case for a national
standard since 1973, when the Court indicated its doubts; but the argument would need
to show the accuracy of such techniques.
'0' See Comment, 15 Loyola LA Enter L J at 441 (cited in note 38) (noting that the
community of cyberspace users is one option in defining national standard). See also Anne
Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the FirstAmendment
in Cyberspaces, 104 Yale L J 1639, 1656, 1672 (1995) (noting that the virtual community
standard is a possible solution to defining obscenity).
" Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex from the Pornographers:Cybersexual Possibilities,83
Georgetown L J 1969, 1992 (1995).
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dards might invalidate local laws. Also, a virtual community
standard would shift the federalism balance away from local
interests and would not recognize the regulatory rights of the
community claiming to be harmed by the obscene material.
Following Miller, courts will disfavor as impractical forcing a
local jury to discern and apply the standards of the cyberspace
community or a subset thereof. Expert testimony on cyberspace
standards also poses problems. The new and changing nature of
cyberspace would make defining its standards even more difficult
than the general national standard. Also, like the national standard, the cyberspace standard would not achieve diversity goals.
B. Policy Problems with a Community-of-Dispatch Standard
A community-of-dispatch standard would not meet the diversity-among-jurisdictions criticisms. The dispatch standard has
the additional policy problem of ignoring the regulatory interest
of the community of receipt.
Limiting venue to the jurisdiction of dispatch and requiring
the jury in that district to follow its own standards would implement a community-of-dispatch policy.'0 5 The jury would then
apply the standards of the local community of dispatch.'
The community-of-dispatch standard would not solve the
diversity-of-standards problem since distributors of obscene material could move to the most permissive jurisdictions. The standards of that community would then dictate the standards for all
communities. If such venue restrictions applied to all media, the
new rule would reverse the obscenity doctrine completely; but
even if the standard applied only to cyberspace, distributors
could send obscene material through cyberspace and avoid stricter standards in other media. Limiting venue only for cyberspace
material, therefore, effectively limits it for other media.
The community-of-dispatch standard creates an additional
policy problem. It ignores the long-recognized regulatory interest

"'
One commentator suggests allowing venue only in "those jurisdictions in which the
BBS operator stores the data, prior to the user's access." Comment, 15 Loyola LA Enter
L J at 442 (cited in note 38). She argues that courts should revise venue rules since they
have eroded due process standards as applied to cyberspace but does not cite any judicial
support for this position. This Comment takes the position that the application of local
standards in cyberspace would meet due process requirements. See notes 44-48 and
accompanying text.
" Tighter controls on prosecutorial forum shopping probably would not solve the
problem. Even without forum shopping, venue would still be available wherever consumers accessed obscene material, including the most restrictive local communities.
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of the community affected by the distribution. Since distributors
of obscene materials could circumvent stricter regulations over
other media, the communities would lose effective control over
those media as well. Thus the dispatch-community standard is
less satisfactory from a policy perspective than local standards.
CONCLUSION

Cyberspace provides a new medium for the distribution of
obscene materials. In other media, juries apply local community
standards to determine obscenity. Current cyberspace technology
does not enable geographical blocking, so obscene material in
cyberspace could face the test of the most conservative location.
The local standard reflects the policy of allowing diverse standards among jurisdictions, but cyberspace technology, as currently developed, would undermine diversity.
On the other hand, applying local standards to cyberspace
would not interfere with non-speech related constitutional rights.
Additionally, the policy advantages of the local standard counterbalance the one diversity policy criticism. Alternatives to the
local standard would pose relatively greater policy problems,
particularly in the area of administrability.
The Supreme Court already retreated from the diversity
policy when it upheld dial-a-porn obscenity prosecutions in the
jurisdiction of the caller. One might thus predict, contrary to
some commentators' views, that the Supreme Court will not overrule Miller as a result of the new technology. Finally, retaining
the local standard would spur investment in technology that
might permit providers of pornography to tailor their offerings
geographically. While cyberspace should not impact the obscenity
doctrine, one might expect obscenity rules to shape the evolution
of cyberspace.

